

**TOP SECRET**

25X1

*Eol*

23 March 1960

25X1

Copy No. C 68

# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



DOCUMENT NO. 20  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☒  
☐ DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S 0  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010  
AUTH: HR 10-2  
DATE: 6 JUN 1999  
REVIEWER: ☐

25X1

25X1

State Dept. review completed

**TOP SECRET**

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005000200001-3

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2005/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005000200001-3

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005000200001-3

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

23 March 1960

### DAILY BRIEF

25X1

#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

25X1

*NO*  
USSR: [Soviet workers have recently protested wage reductions resulting from the shortened workday by staging meetings and slowdowns.] In addition, the reported outbreak of worker disturbances in Kazakhstan last October has recently been confirmed. [These protests are isolated but signify an emboldened worker attitude that contributes to pressure on the regime to improve living standards.]

25X1

*OK*  
USSR: A Soviet lecturer, speaking before an elite Moscow audience on 16 March on recent developments in Asian and African Communist parties, singled out only Guinea and Sekou Touré for unqualified praise. He criticized other nationalist leaders, including Nehru, Sukarno, U Nu, Nasir, Abboud, and Qasim. The speaker's remarks probably reflect a feeling among Soviet policymakers that the Communist bloc's economic and military assistance programs have produced fewer political dividends than expected. (Page 2)

25X1

25X1

#### II. ASIA-AFRICA




25X1

25X1

[redacted] South Korea - Japan: The crisis in relations between Seoul and Tokyo which developed recently over the seizure of Japanese fishermen has been eased by Seoul's agreement to exchange by the end of March 167 Japanese fishermen for approximately 1,000 Koreans detained in Japan for illegal entry. Even if this matter is settled satisfactorily, serious differences will remain at issue between the two countries. [redacted]

25X1

25X1



25X1

### III. THE WEST

*no* Cuba: On 21 March Foreign Minister Roa strongly objected to Ambassador Bonsal's expressed regret that the Castro government had chosen a "position outside the free-world community." He insisted that Cuba has only asserted its freedom in its foreign policy. Ambassador Bonsal is skeptical over results of negotiations concerning Cuban-US frictions. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

23 Mar 60

DAILY BRIEF

ii

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005000200001-3

Approved For Release 2005/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005000200001-3

## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

### Soviet Labor Disturbances

[There has recently been considerable agitation among those Soviet workers whose wages have been reduced as a result of the introduction of a seven-hour day

25X1

25X1

Workers complained that they had been promised that no reduction in wages would take place. When told that they could maintain their income by increased productivity, some workers contended that they were willing but that factory equipment was inadequate.]

The outbreak of labor disturbances in the Kazakh republic last October has been confirmed. The Kazakh party chief, in a recent speech to the republic party congress, admitted that "work stoppages" stemming from unsatisfactory living conditions occurred at that time at the construction site of the Karaganda Metallurgical Plant at Temir-Tau, near Karaganda.

Previous reports asserted that riots and strikes involving students in an industrial school and a large majority of the construction workers at the metallurgical plant immobilized Temir-Tau for several days in early October. The demonstrations, allegedly touched off by resentment at the better living conditions enjoyed by Eastern European contract workers, were finally quelled by troops brought in from outside. A number of the participants were shot or arrested.

25X1

These outbreaks, though isolated and controllable, are signs of an emboldened worker attitude and will bring increased pressure on the regime to improve living standards.

Soviet Lecturer Praises Touré; Criticizes Other Afro-Asian Leaders

A quasi-official Soviet spokesman, lecturing before an elite Moscow audience on 16 March on recent developments in Asian and African Communist parties, singled out Sekou Touré as the only Asian or African nationalist leader deserving of unqualified praise. Touré was portrayed as an honest and vigorous "Marxist," and the Guinean Democratic party--while not Communist--as a "good party with good perspectives." The talk, which emphasized the weakness of Communist parties in Africa due to the absence of an industrial working class, clearly reflects Moscow's high hopes of using Guinea as a vehicle for expanding Communist bloc influence in Africa.

In contrast, the lecturer voiced contemptuous disapproval of other "national bourgeois" leaders, including Nehru, Sukarno, U Nu, Qasim, Nasir, and Abboud, who were pictured as unreliable and vacillating. They were especially censured for their tendency to discard local Communists after accepting their support in a common struggle for freedom against colonial powers.

This unusually strong criticism of "national bourgeois" leaders and their policies probably reflects opinion among Soviet policymakers that the Communist bloc's economic and military assistance programs should have produced greater political dividends. While Soviet ideological writings have reflected this irritation in the past, evidence is generally lacking that Moscow is planning any policy shift in the near future in favor of a tougher line toward the Afro-Asian neutralist countries or increased militancy by local Communist parties. Both tendencies would, of course, undercut the current Soviet campaign for international detente.

The speaker sharply attacked Nasir for his dictatorial methods and suppression of Communists and claimed that Khrushchev would refuse to visit the UAR because this would imply an endorsement of the UAR regime.

25X1

Commenting on the difficulties which have been encountered by Iraqi Communists, the lecturer criticized the party for pushing ahead for power too quickly--an error it publicly admitted last July following the Kirkuk incident. The speaker also pointed out that the Iraqi Communist party is strong, nevertheless, and made the unwarranted claim that it can call on "tens of thousands of armed supporters."

25X1

25X1

25X1



25X1

Approved For Release 2005/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005000200001-3

Approved For Release 2005/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005000200001-3

Japanese - South Korean Crisis Averted by Detainee  
Exchange Agreement

Reluctant agreement by South Korea to a mutual exchange of detainees with Japan has relaxed pressures on Tokyo for strong action against Seoul's "hostage diplomacy" and has thus eased the most serious crisis between the countries since World War II. The exchange is supposed to take place at the end of March and include 167 Japanese fishermen who have completed sentences for fishing within the "Rhee line" and approximately 1,000 Koreans who are being detained for illegal entry into Japan.

Widespread public feeling in Japan had forced the government to consider referring the Rhee line and detainees disputes to the UN, expelling the Korean diplomatic mission in Tokyo, and adopting stronger measures to protect Japanese fishing vessels. These pressures together with US representations and a desire to allay adverse international criticism of fraudulent practices in recent South Korean elections influenced Seoul to agree to the exchange.

25X1

Many serious differences remain, and a settlement continues to be remote. South Korea has not committed itself to release an additional 47 fishermen when their sentences expire, and difficulties may develop concerning some 176 Korean detainees in Japan who have asked to go to North Korea. South Korean Ambassador Yu in Tokyo is insisting that they be "quietly" shipped to South Korea, but Tokyo is unlikely to agree to this arrangement.

South Korea also has not retreated on the issue of the Rhee line nor indicated that it will refrain from future seizures. Japan has already announced that after 1 April its patrol vessels in the Rhee line will mount three-inch guns as well as machine guns, but orders against actually opening fire have not yet been lifted. A return by South Korea to an intransigent position in relations with Japan is certain to result in renewed public pressures in Japan for retaliatory action.

25X1

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005000200001-3

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2005/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005000200001-3

25X1

Castro Government Attitudes

25X1

[Cuban Foreign Minister Roa on 21 March strongly objected to Ambassador Bonsal's expressed regret that the Castro government had chosen a position outside the free-world community. Roa insisted that Cuba has merely asserted its freedom in foreign policy for the first time and implied that he does not believe the Communist bloc represents slavery.]

[Roa rejected US charges that seizures of American properties by the Cuban Government are extralegal and said that dissatisfied former owners were free to pursue their cases by judicial means. Several owners have already had recourse to Cuban courts without gaining any satisfaction. Roa claimed that extradition requests for 500 Cuban "war criminals" in the United States had been denied. Ambassador Bonsal pointed out that only two or three had been requested.]

[Speeches by President Dorticos and National Bank President Guevara on 20 March indicate that the Castro government plans no modification of its unreasonable attitude and that it expects all concessions to be made by the United States. Dorticos charged the United States with trying to starve Cuba and with culpability in the La Coubre explosion. Guevara reiterated the claim that the United States has kept Cuba in economic servitude. Ambassador Bonsal is skeptical that negotiations over Cuban-US problems will produce satisfactory results in this atmosphere. Public resentment in Cuba was again aroused on 21 March when a plane from the United States was captured during an alleged attempt to fly out former Batista supporters; this will strengthen Castro's attitude.]

25X1

[Foreign Minister Roa made no specific arrangements to open negotiations and will visit Caracas from 24 to 29 March]

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0005000200001-3

# **THE PRESIDENT**

## **The Vice President**

### **Executive Offices of the White House**

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs  
 Scientific Adviser to the President  
 Director of the Budget  
 Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization  
 Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration  
 Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination  
 Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities  
 Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy  
 Executive Secretary, National Security Council

### **The Treasury Department**

The Secretary of the Treasury

### **The Department of State**

The Secretary of State  
 The Under Secretary of State  
 The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs  
 The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs  
 The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration  
 The Counselor  
 Director, International Cooperation Administration  
 The Director of Intelligence and Research

### **The Department of Defense**

The Secretary of Defense  
 The Deputy Secretary of Defense  
 Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs  
 The Secretary of the Army  
 The Secretary of the Navy  
 The Secretary of the Air Force  
 The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff  
 The Director, The Joint Staff  
 Chief of Staff, United States Army  
 Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy  
 Chief of Staff, United States Air Force  
 Commandant, United States Marine Corps  
 Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations  
 Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff  
 Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army  
 Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy  
 Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force  
 Supreme Allied Commander, Europe  
 Commander in Chief, Pacific

### **The Department of Commerce**

The Secretary of Commerce

### **Federal Bureau of Investigation**

The Director

### **Atomic Energy Commission**

The Chairman

### **National Security Agency**

The Director

### **National Indications Center**

The Director

Approved For Release 2005/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0005000200001-3

**TOP SECRET**

Approved For Release 2005/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005000200001-3

Approved For Release 2005/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005000200001-3

**TOP SECRET**